Angela Mendelovici

Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy, Stevenson Hall
The University of Western Ontario
1151 Richmond Street
London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 5B8

Phone: available upon request
Email: angela.mendelovici@uwo.ca
Web: https://publish.uwo.ca/~amendel5
PhilPeople: angela-mendelovici

Employment

Current employment

– Professor (with tenure), Department of Philosophy, The University of Western Ontario (2026–present)

Past employment

– Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Philosophy, The University of Western Ontario (Western University, 2018–2026)

– Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Western University (2010–2018)

– Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Jan. 2011–July 2011, Jan. 2012–July 2012)

Education

– Ph.D., Philosophy, Princeton University (2005–2010)

– B.A., Philosophy Honors (Minor in Psychology), McGill University (2001–2005)

Areas of specialization

– Philosophy of mind (intentionality, consciousness, perception, concepts)

Areas of competence

– Philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, critical thinking,

Publications

Monograph

1. **Mendelovici, A.** (2018). *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Oxford University Press.

Articles

2. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (forthcoming). Tracking Representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, 2nd Edition*. Continuum. (Revision of 2014 version)

3. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2026). Debunking Under Uncertainty: A Probabilistic Criterion and the Case of Edenic Color Realism. *Synthèse 207* (197).

4. **Mendelovici, A.** (2026). What Smells? Olfactory Objects and the Objects of Perception. *Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 7*.

5. **Mendelovici, A.** (2026). Restricted Deflationism: Why the Deflationist Project Needs at Least a Little Bit of Intentionality. *Mind and Language Language 41* (4): 531–540. (Symposium on Frances Egan's *Deflating Mental Representation*)

6. **Mendelovici, A.** (2026). Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions. In Eric Schwitzgebel and Jonathan Jong (eds.). *What is Belief?* Oxford University Press.

7. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2026). Is *Narrow Content*'s "Narrow Content" Narrow Content? *Inquiry*: 1–19 (Symposium on Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne's *Narrow Content*, published online in 2022)

8. **Mendelovici, A.** (2025). Phenomenal Intentionality and Derived Intentionality: A Commentary on David Pitt's *The Quality of Thought*. *Journal of Consciousness Studies 32* (3): 175–192.

9. **Mendelovici, A.** (2024). Singular Contents (With and Without Objects). In Berit Brogaard, Robert French, and Otavio Bueno (eds.). *The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception*. Synthèse Book Series, pp. 133–156.

10. **Mendelovici, A.** (2024). Three Perspectives on Perspective. In Mitchell Green and Jan Michel (eds.). *William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 67–100.

11. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2024). Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue. *Argumenta 9* (2): 3347–361.

12. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2023). Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality. *Philosophical Perspectives 37* (1): 228–247.

13. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, B. (2023). Debunking Debunking: Explanationism, Probabilistic Sensitivity, and Why There Is No Specifically Metacognitive Debunking Principle. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47*: 25–52.

14. **Mendelovici, A.** (2023). Attenuated Representationalism. *Analysis Reviews 38* (2): 373–393. (Critical notice of David Papineau's *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience*)

15. **Mendelovici, A.** (2023). Truth and Content in Sensory Experience. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 3*. Oxford University Press, pp. 318–338. (Critical notice of David Papineau's *The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience*)

16. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2022). Kolors Without Colors, Representation without Intentionality. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105* (2): 476–483. (Symposium on Karen Neander's *A Mark of the Mental*)

17. **Mendelovici, A.** (2021). Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality. *European Journal of Philosophy 31*: 458–467. (Symposium on Uriah Kriegel's *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value*)

18. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2020). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, pp. 560–585.

19. **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions. In Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.). *Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker*. Routledge.

20. **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs. In Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.). *The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision*. Oxford University Press, pp. 99–117.

21. **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Panpsychism's Combination Problem is a Problem for Everyone. In William Seager (ed.). *The Routledge Handbook for Panpsychism*. Routledge.

22. **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Reply to Philip Woodward's Review of *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*. *Philosophical Psychology 32* (8): 1261–1267.

23. **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Immediate and Reflective Senses. In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado, and Dena Shottenkirk (eds.). *Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics*. Routledge.

24. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2019). Phenomenal Intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality>. (Revision of 2016 version)

25. **Mendelovici, A.** (2018). Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). *Non-propositional Intentionality*. Oxford University Press.

26. **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation. *Disputatio 8* (42): 57–92.

27. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici, A.** (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality>.

28. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. *Philosophy Compass 9* (5): 325–337.

29. **Mendelovici, A.** (2014). Pure Intentionalism about Moods and Emotions. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge, pp. 135–157.

30. Bourget, D. and **Mendelovici A.** (2014). Tracking Representationalism: Lycan, Dretske, and Tye. In Andrew Bailey (ed.). *Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers*. Continuum, pp. 209–235.

31. **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Intentionalism about Moods. *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2* (1): 126–136.

32. **Mendelovici, A.** (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation (2013). *Philosophical Studies 165 (2)*: 421–443.

33. Parkinson, C., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Koralus, P., **Mendelovici, A.**, McGeer, V., and Wheatley, T. (2011). Is Morality Unified? Evidence that Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23* (10): 3162–3180.

Book reviews

34. **Mendelovici, A.** (2025). Review of David Pitt's *The Quality of Thought*. *The European Journal of Philosophy 33* (4): 1605–1611.

35. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2023). Review of Michael Tye's *Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass*. *Philosophical Review 132* (2): 338–343.

36. **Mendelovici, A.** (2020). Review of Laura Candiotto's (ed.) *The Value of Emotions for Knowledge*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

37. **Mendelovici, A.** and Bourget, D. (2019). Review of Karen Neander's *A Mark of the Mental*. *Philosophical Review 128* (3):378–385.

38. **Mendelovici A.** (2014). Review of Dominic Gregory's *Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and their Contents*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

39. **Mendelovici A.** and Bourget, D. (2013). Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's (eds.) *Cognitive Phenomenology*. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91* (3):601–604.

40. **Mendelovici A.** (2013). Review of Tim Bayne's *The Unity of Consciousness*. *Philosophical Psychology 26* (1):158–162.

41. **Mendelovici A.** and Nielsen, K. (2012). Review of Steward Goetz and Charles Taliaferro's *A Brief History of the Soul*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*.

Interviews and public engagement

1. "How Does Consciousness Connect Us to Reality? Part II" (2022). Interview on Philip Goff and Keith Frankish's *Mind Chat*. <https://youtu.be/O9gi3Mr3o8w>

2. "What is Intentionality? Phenomenal Intentionality Theory and the Role of Qualia" (2022). Interview on Tevin Naidu's *The Mind-Body Solution*. <https://youtu.be/WhgbZz-iJ4k>

3. "Intentionality, Consciousness, and Panpsychism (with Professor Angela Mendelovici)" (2019). Interview on Cody Turner's *Tent Talks*. <https://codyturnercreations.com/2019/08/17/37-intentionality-consciousness-and-panpsychism-with-professor-angela-mendelovici/>

4. "Amy Kind and Angela Mendelovici on Representationalism About Moods" (2013). *Philosophy TV* episode with Amy Kind. <http://www.philostv.com/amy-kind-and-angela-mendelovici>

5. "A Sample Philosophy Paper" (2010). <http://prezi.com/z4h1_fwilbxj>

Presentations

Upcoming presentations

1. The Cognitive and Representational Role of Intentionality
   - York University, Dec. 2026 (invited)

2. The Cognitive and Representational Role of Intentionality
   - Ohio State University, April 2027 (invited)

3. Comments on Woo Ram Lee's "Doxastic Deliberation Reconsidered"
   - Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Eastern APA), January 2027 (invited)

Past presentations

4. What Does It Smell Like from Here? Perspectival Olfactory Experiences
   - Nottingham Smell Workshop, July 2026 (invited)

5. Loving Control: The Permissibility of Peer Paternalism (with Anthony Skelton)
   - Canadian Philosophical Association's Annual Meeting, June 2026 (refereed)

6. Loving Control: The Permissibility of Peer Paternalism (with Anthony Skelton)
   - Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Meeting, July 2026 (refereed)

7. Deep Internalism
   - University of Alberta Colloquium Series, March 2026 (invited)

8. Comments on Brian Cutter's "The Psychophysical Harmony Argument"
   - Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Eastern APA), January 2026 (invited)

9. Comments on Uriah Kriegel's "Conscious Intentionality: What Vision and Mood Teach Us"

- Session on Contemporary Philosophy, New York University (NYU) Conference on Issues in the History of Modern Philosophy: Intentionality, November 2025 (invited)

10. Comments on Joshua Myers' "Imagination and Understanding"
    - Cornell Workshop on Mind and Value IV, September 2025 (invited)
11. What Smells? The Objects of Olfactory Representation
    - Olfactory Philosophy (ESPP Satellite Workshop), April–May 2025 (invited)
12. Does Intentionality Connect us to the World? (And, if So, How?)
    - The First-Person Science of Consciousness 2025: Ontological Implications for the Understanding of Mind and Reality, Mannheim, Germany, May 2025 (invited)
13. Comments on Javier Gomez-Lavin's "Reportability Does Not Entail Consciousness: A Study of Two Cases"
    - Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Eastern APA), January 2025 (invited)
14. Phenomenal Intentionality and Derived Intentionality: Comments on David Pitt's *The Quality of Thought*
    - Author Meets Critics Session on David Pitt's *The Quality of Thought*, Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division (Pacific APA), March 2024 (invited)
15. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
    - DEX 9, University of California—Davis, April 2024 (invited)
16. Does Intentionality Connect Us to the World?
    - Symposium on Consciousness and Cognition (organized by Angela Mendelovici and David Bourget), Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2024 (refereed)
17. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
    - Invited Session on Perceptual Particularity, Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Eastern APA), January 2024 (invited)
18. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
    - Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience (PPN) Research Seminar, University of Glasgow, November 2023 (invited)
19. Commentary on John Doris' "Of Sharks and Citations: Harman on Peer Review"
    - Harmania: Conference in Honor of Gilbert Harman, Princeton University, September–October 2023 (invited)
20. Does Intentionality Connect Us to the World?
    - Philosophy of Mind Works in Progress Group, July 2023 (invited)
21. Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality
    - UC Santa Cruz Colloquium Series, May 2023 (invited)
22. Phenomenal Intentionality
    - Guest Presentation at Christopher Stratman's Mental Representation seminar at University of Texas at San Antonio, April 2023 (invited)
23. Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality
    - Toronto Metropolitan University Colloquium Series, April 2023 (invited)

24. Facing Up to the Problem of Intentionality
    - Philosophy of Mind Works in Progress Group, April 2023 (invited)
25. Phenomenal Intentionality
    - Guest Presentation at Adam Pautz and Christopher Hill's Mental Representation seminar at Brown University, December 2022 (invited)
26. What Makes Teleosemantics a Theory of Content?
    - 44th Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy in Honor of Ruth Millikan, November 2022 (invited)
27. How to Reject the Act-Object Distinction and Be a Russellian Monist
    - Keynote speaker at Russell 150 Conference, The Department of Theoretical Philosophy and the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Bucharest and the Constantin Rădulescu-Motru Institute of Philosophy and Psychology at the Romanian Academy, November 2022 (invited)
28. Emotion as Reliable Misrepresentation
    - Feeling Towards: The Unity of Phenomenology and Intentionality in Emotion, University of Bonn and University of Würzburg, July 2022 (invited)
29. How to Reject the Act-Object Distinction and Be a Russellian Monist
    - Analysis of Mind Centenary: History and Future of Russellian Monism, McMaster University, June 2022
30. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
    - LEMM Group Talk, University of Toronto, April 2022 (invited)
31. Panpsychism: Ignorance and Acquaintance
    - Workshop on the Combination Problem, February 2022 (invited)
32. Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects)
    - How are we able to think about things? Umeå University, October 2021 (invited)
33. Deep Internalism
    - Keynote speaker at Analytic Phenomenology, Intentionality and Consciousness, IUSS: The Mark of the Mental Project, October 2021 (invited)
34. Phenomenal Intentionality and Voluntarism About Truth and Reference
    - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2021 (refereed)
35. Debunking Arguments Against Color
    - Invited Session on Color Debunking Arguments, Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division (Pacific APA), April 2021 (initially scheduled for April 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19, invited)
36. Radical Internalism
    - Indiana University, Bloomington, Department of Philosophy, April 2021 (invited)
37. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
    - Undergraduate Philosophy Club, Indiana University, Bloomington, Department of Philosophy, April 2021 (invited)
38. Phenomenal intentionality
    - Ned Block and David Chalmers' Mind & Language seminar "Theories of intentionality," New York University, April 2021 (invited)

39. Summary of *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality* and Reply to Critics
    - Author meets critics session on my *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality* (organizer: Dimitria Gatzia; critics: Elijah Chudnoff, Amy Kind, and Adam Pautz), Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), December 2020 (initially scheduled for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19, invited)
40. Commentary on Sarah Arnaud and Kate Pendoley's "Intentionalism and the Understanding of Emotion Experience"
    - Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, December 2020 (initially scheduled for March 2020 but postponed due to COVID-19, invited)
41. Radical Internalism
    - Oxford University, Department of Philosophy, Metaphysics of Consciousness Series, February 2021 (invited)
42. Radical Internalism
    - Summer of Consciousness Conference (organized by Uriah Kriegel), June 2020 (invited)
43. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
    - Concordia University Philosophy Colloquium Series, 2019 (invited)
44. Complexity Without Combination: Panpsychism Without the Combination Problem
    - Session on Panpsychism (organized by Philipp Goff), The Science of Consciousness Conference, Interlaken, June 2019 (invited)
45. Phenomenal Intentionality, Thought, and Cognitive Phenomenology
    - Central European University Summer School, "Cognitive Phenomenology," July 2019 (invited)
46. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
    - Central European University Summer School, "Cognitive Phenomenology," July 2019 (invited)
47. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
    - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019) (invited)
48. Thoughts, Unconscious States, and Other Challenging Cases for the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
    - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019) (invited)
49. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
    - Phenomenal Intentionality (workshop based on my monograph *The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality*, Ruhr Universität Bochum, June 2019) (invited)
50. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
    - The Role and Reality of Consciousness, University of Crete, Rethymnon, Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, May 2019 (invited)
51. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
    - Phenomenal Intentionality Workshop, St. Raffaele University, Milan, May 2019 (invited)
52. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
    - Session on Perception, Meeting of the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology, March 2019 (invited)

53. The Phenomenal Basis of Truth and Reference
    - University of Notre Dame, Philosophy Department Colloquium, April 2019 (invited)
54. Phenomenal Intentionality in Perception
    - Winter Workshop in Philosophy of Perception, UC San Diego, February 2019 (invited)
55. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
    - Department of Philosophy and Education Science, University of Turin, May 2019 (invited)
56. Phenomenal Intentionality, Thought, and Cognitive Phenomenology
    - Cognitive Phenomenology, Central European University Summer School, May 2019 (invited)
57. Non-Relational Views of Phenomenal Intentionality and Truth and Reference to the Mind-Independent World
    - Cognitive Phenomenology, Central European University Summer School, May 2019 (invited)
58. Doing Without External Acquaintance
    - Acquaintance and Direct Grasp, Institut Jean Nicod, July 2018 (invited)
59. Using Technology to Improve Critical Thinking Skills
    - Getting Students to Think Critically: Perspectives from the Disciplines Panel Presentation and Discussion, Fall Perspectives on Teaching Conference, Western University, August 2017 (invited)
60. Mental Combination
    - Russellian Monism: Time for the Details, Central European University, August 2017 (invited)
61. The Hard Problem of Mental Combination
    - Consciousness and Intentionality, University of Crete, Athens, July 2017 (invited)
62. The Deep Natures and Superficial Characters of Intentional States and Contents
    - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2017 (refereed)
63. Fixing Reference on Intentionality and the Mismatch Problem
    - Central European University Summer School, "Mind, Matter, and Consciousness," July 21, 2016 (invited)
64. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory and Self-Ascriptivism
    - Central European University Summer School, "Mind, Matter, and Consciousness," July 21, 2016 (invited)
65. Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought
    - Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop and Network (SPAWN) 10: Consciousness, Syracuse University, July 2015 (invited)
66. Immediate and Reflective Senses
    - Oakland University Department of Philosophy Colloquium, March 2015 (invited)
67. Immediate and Reflective Senses
    - Victoria University at Wellington, May 2014 (invited)
68. Immediate and Reflective Senses
    - PhilMiLCog Keynote, June 2014 (invited)
69. The Derived Content View (with David Bourget)

- Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2014 (invited)

70. The Derived Content View (with David Bourget)
    - Interfaces of the Mind, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, July 2012 (invited)
71. The Derived Content View (with David Bourget)
    - Intentionality and Phenomenality Conference, Crete, June 2012 (invited)
72. Is the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory Naturalistic? (with David Bourget)
    - Mardi Gras in Mind Workshop, Tulane University, February 2014 (invited)
73. Intentionalism About Moods
    - 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, August 2013 (refereed)
74. Phenomenal Intentionality About Thought
    - Cognitive Phenomenology Workshop, Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2013 (invited)
75. Comments on David Bourget "Representationalism and Perceptual Distortion"
    - Meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2013 (invited)
76. The Monadic View of Intentionality
    - American Association of Philosophy, Pacific Division, March 2013 (invited)
77. The Monadic View of Intentionality
    - University of Toronto, March 2013 (invited)
78. The Monadic View of Intentionality
    - McMaster University, February 2013 (invited)
79. How Concepts Get Their Contents
    - University of Wisconsin—Madison, February 2013 (invited)
80. How Concepts Get Their Contents
    - Yeshiva University, February 2013 (invited)
81. The Role of Phenomenal Consciousness in Thought
    - University of Melbourne Seminar Series, March 2012 (invited)
82. The Role of Phenomenal Consciousness in Thought
    - Mind and Consciousness Conference, The University of Western Australia, February 2012 (invited)
83. The Role of Phenomenal Consciousness in Thought
    - Hong Kong University, January 2012 (invited)
84. The Conscious Experience of Pain
    - Wellesley College, November 2011 (invited)
85. Intentionalism About Emotions
    - Wayne State University, October 2011 (invited)
86. Intentionalism About Emotions
    - Australasian Association of Philosophy, Dunedin, July 2011 (refereed)
87. Intentionalism About Emotions

- Charles Sturt University, July 2011 (invited)

88. Intentionalism About Emotions
    - The Australian National University Women's Work-in-Progress Seminar, May 2011 (invited)
89. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets Conceptual Atomism
    - European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Milan, September 2011 (refereed)
90. Do Phenomenal Characters Compose?
    - Consciousness at the Beach IV, The Australian National University, July 2011 (invited)
91. Perceptual Subcapacities: Tracking and Representation
    - Perceptual Capacities Workshop, The Australian National University, July 2011 (invited)
92. All Cognitive Content is Conscious Content
    - The Australian National University, Seminar, January 2011 (invited)
93. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
    - The University of Western Ontario, January 2010 (invited)
94. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
    - Washington University at St. Louis, January 2010 (invited)
95. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
    - The University of Waterloo, January 2010 (invited)
96. A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology of Thought
    - Cornell University, February 2010 (invited)
97. Comments on Pekka Väyrynen's 'Thick Concepts and Presupposition
    - Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, August 2010 (invited)
98. Comments on Chandra Sripada's "The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action"
    - Moral Psychology Conference, Princeton University, November 2008 (invited)
99. The Varieties of Content
    - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, August 2008 (invited)
100. The Varieties of Content
    - Philosophical Society, Research School of Social Sciences, Philosophy Program, The Australian National University, August 2008 (invited)
101. Derived Mental Representation
    - Australasian Association of Philosophy, July 2008 (refereed)
102. Does Intentional Content Supervene on Phenomenal Character?
    - Eighth Annual International Graduate Conference in Philosophy: Experience and Truth, University of Toronto, May 2008 (refereed)
103. Systematic Error About Color and What to Do About It
    - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, April 2008 (invited)
104. Derived Mental Representation and the Phenomenology of Thought

- University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2008 (refereed)

105. Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem
    - Eleventh Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, CUNY, March 2008 (refereed)

106. Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem
    - University of Minnesota Graduate Philosophy Conference, "Philosophy on Ice," February 2008 (refereed)

107. Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem
    - Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University, November 2007 (invited)

Teaching

2026–2027

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2025–2026

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)

2024–2025

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2023–2024

- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2022–2023

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2021–2022

- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1230B: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)

2020–2021

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)
- Philosophy 1230A: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)

2017–2018

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)
- Philosophy 9617A: Survey in Philosophy of Mind: Mental Representation (graduate seminar)
- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind

2016–2017

- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (online)
- Philosophy 1200: Reasoning and Critical Thinking (blended)

2015–2016

- Philosophy 4410F/9617A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind

2013–2014

- Philosophy 2400G: Introduction to Philosophy of Mind
- Philosophy 4410G/9611A: Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind
- Consciousness and Intentionality Prospectus Course (prospectus reading course)

2012–2013

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9661A: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Propositional Attitudes Prospectus Course (graduate reading course)
- Panpsychism (graduate reading course)

2011–2012

- Philosophy 3410F: Advanced Topics in Philosophy of Mind (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4410F/9605: Concepts (graduate/undergraduate seminar)

2010–2011

- Philosophy 2260F: Introduction to Philosophy of Language (undergraduate)
- Philosophy 4991F/9407: Problems in Philosophy: Mental Representation (graduate/advanced undergraduate seminar)
- Foundations Seminar: Mental Representation (graduate seminar, ANU)
- Non-Veridical Representation (undergraduate reading course)

PhD supervision

1. Simon Raposo (ongoing)
2. Daniel Bjorklund (ongoing)
3. Saher Panjwani (ongoing)
4. Isabella Braga (co-supervising with Anthony Skelton, ongoing)
5. Ashkan Parchizadeh, 2025–present (co-supervising with John Thorp)
6. Yen-Tung Lee, A Defense of Virtual Veridicalism (co-supervising with David Bourget, completed 2024)
7. Shawn Bartlett, *Intentionality and Experiencing Values* (completed 2023)
8. Stephen Pearce, *A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes* (completed 2016)
9. Christopher Young, *Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact* (co-supervised with Andrew Botterell, completed 2015)

MA supervision

1. Saher Panjwani, *Empirical Work on the Combination Problem* (completed 2023)
2. Mingyan Yang, *On the Relation Between Cognitive Penetration and the Rich Content View* (completed 2023)
3. Sameera Singh, *The Content Indeterminacy Problem of a Forward-Looking Theory of Mental Content* (completed 2022)
4. Jiafang (Jeff) He, *Reflections on Our Essence and Our Way of Persisting* (completed 2021)
5. Kyler Furlotte, *Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases: Is Ontology Relevant?* (completed 2016)
6. Gregory Horne, *The Root of the Combination Problem for Panpsychism* (completed 2013)
7. Stephen Pearce, *Sense Modalities and Representationalism* (completed 2011)

PhD advising

1. Rowan Green (ongoing)
2. Dmitry Turko (ongoing)
3. Benjamin Stone, TBA (second reader, ongoing)
4. Jessica du Toit, *What Do We Owe Animals in the Context of Health-Related Research?* (completed 2023)
5. Jaclyn Lanthier, *Understanding Epistemic Feelings via Interdisciplinary Corroboration* (prospectus advisor, completed 2017)
6. Andrew Peterson, *Assessing Decision-Making Capacity After Severe Brain Injury* (completed 2016)
7. Nicolas McGinnis, *Reference and Experiment* (completed 2015)
8. O'Neal Buchanan, *Rethinking Empathy: Value and Context in Motivation and Adaptation* (completed 2015)
9. Matthew Ivanowich, *Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology* (completed 2015)
10. James Southworth, *William James' Theory of Emotion* (completed 2014)

PhD external examining

1. Connor D. Quinn, *Make Perception Phenomenology Again*, University of Texas at Austin (external examiner, completed 2023)
2. I-Sen Chen, *Converse Intentionalism and Experiential Content*, University of California—San Diego (external examiner, completed 2021)
3. Blaine Kenneally, *Intentionality from Structure: A Non-Relational Account of the Constitution of Phenomenal Intentionality*, University of Edinburgh (external examiner, completed 2019)

Awards

– Vice-Provost (Academic Programs) Award for Excellence in Online Teaching and Learning, 2024 (jointly with David Bourget and Chris Viger)

– Graham and Gale Wright Distinguished Scholar Award, Western University, 2021–2022

– Dean's Travel Fund, Western University, 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 2015–2016, 2016–2017, 2017–2018, 2023–2024, 2025–2026

– Faculty Research Development Fund, Western University, 2017–2018, 2018–2019

– Teaching Honour Roll, Western University, 2011–2012, 2012–2013, 2013–2014, 2014–2015, 2015–2016

– 2nd Place, Women's Division, Princeton Outdoor Action Bouldering Competition, 2008

Service

– Graduate Program Chair, July 1, 2021–2023, 2024–present

– Graduate Education Council, July 2025–June 2027

– Appointments Committee, various years

– Chair of Visiting Speakers Committee, July 1, 2012–2014, 2020–June 30, 2021

– Graduate Admissions Committee, various years

– Chair of Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, 2017–2018

– Workload Committee, 2016–2017

– Mind and Language Area Chair, 2012–2014

– Canadian Philosophical Association Programme Committee, 2013–2014

– Co-chair of the Committee for Women's Concerns, 2011–2013

– Visiting Speakers Committee, 2011–2012

– Undergraduate Recruitment and Outreach Committee, 2010–2012

– Reviewer for many journals

September 30, 2026